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César Pérez-López**, Guillermo Maraver-Tarifa*
ABSTRACT: Spain is one of the European countries with more municipalities 
adhering to the Local Agenda 21 (LA21). Environmental spending exerts a great 
influence on implementing LA21. But some authors raise doubts about the firm 
commitment of local governments to LA21 objectives.
Thus, the main objective of this paper is to verify whether political commitment is 
backed up with action towards meeting the objectives of sustainable development 
by means of budgetary support for waste management policies. 
To accomplish this, we applied the Difference in Differences technique for the period 
2002-2012 in the Spanish municipalities. Our initial results confirmed the original 
hypotheses and showed that local governments that adhered to LA21 were genuinely 
committed to achieving at least one LA21 goal and offering greater budgetary sup-
port for waste management. However, the sensitivity analysis revealed unexpectedly 
ambiguous evidence about the research question, in that we observed a great volatil-
ity of results depending on the sample and dependent variables chosen.
JEL Classification: H72; Q53; Q58; C21; C33.
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La gestión de residuos en los municipios españoles: ¿Hay algo más que buenas 
intenciones tras la adhesión a la Agenda 21 Local?
RESUMEN: España es uno de los países europeos con más municipios adheridos 
a la Agenda 21 Local (AL21). El gasto medioambiental ejerce una gran influencia 
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en la implementación de la AL21. No obstante, algunos autores han planteado 
dudas sobre la existencia de un compromiso real por parte de los gobiernos locales 
con los objetivos de la AL21.
Así pues, el principal objetivo de este trabajo es verificar la autenticidad del com-
promiso político hacia el cumplimiento de los objetivos de desarrollo sostenible 
por parte de las autoridades locales, reflejando dicho compromiso en el apoyo pre-
supuestario a las políticas de gestión de residuos.
Para llevar a cabo tal verificación aplicaremos la técnica conocida como Diferencia 
en diferencias sobre los datos presupuestarios de los municipios españoles duran-
te el periodo 2002-2012. Los resultados inicialmente obtenidos confirmaron que 
los gobiernos locales adheridos a la AL21 están realmente comprometidos con al 
menos un objetivo de la AL21, el relativo a la gestión de residuos, y dicho compro-
miso se ve reflejado en un mayor apoyo presupuestario. No obstante, el análisis de 
sensibilidad puso de manifiesto la existencia de una inesperada y ambigua eviden-
cia respecto a la pregunta de investigación. Se observa una notable volatilidad de 
los resultados dependiendo de la muestra y la variable dependiente elegida.
Clasificación JEL: H72; Q53; Q58; C21; C33.
Palabras clave: Agenda Local 21; gestión de residuos; diferencia en diferencias.
1. Introduction and objectives
With the signing of the Aalborg Commitments (Aalborg+10), local governments 
accept their responsibilities to adopt a list of 50 qualitative objectives organized into 
10 themes. Three out of 50 objectives are related to waste management: the avoid-
ance and reduction of waste along with increased reuse and recycling; the manage-
ment and treatment of waste in accordance with best practice standards; and, the pro-
motion of climate protection policy embedded in policies such as energy, transport, 
procurement, waste, agriculture, and forestry.
The six main drivers that influence waste management have been identified as 
public health, environmental protection, value of waste as a resource, «closing the 
loop», institutional and responsibility issues, and public awareness. The influence of 
each driver has changed over time and among countries, depending on their level of 
development as well as their strategies. These drivers are integrated and connected 
with all the aspects related to sustainable development (Wilson, 2007). 
Traditionally, local governments have played a relevant role in waste manage-
ment. Municipal solid waste generation is affected by different factors, such as pop-
ulation, socioeconomic development, and income level. In general, the greater the 
economic prosperity, the greater the amount of waste produced (Singh, Laurenti, 
Sinha and Frostell, 2014). 
Nonetheless, in recent years, European economic production and consumption 
have become less waste intensive. One of the objectives in the EU waste policy is to 
reduce waste generation in absolute terms, within the overall goal of decoupling eco-
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nomic growth from resource use and environmental impacts. In fact, waste preven-
tion efforts across Europe seem to be making a positive contribution towards these 
objectives, albeit with considerable differences between the countries.
Basically, the term sustainability has been identified with an alternative, envi-
ronmentally friendly, socially equitable, and sustainable development model. This 
term is an ambivalent concept, however, that raises two serious questions —first, the 
need to focus on political, social and economic issues, and, second, the need to define 
potential strategies to transform the current model. The Local Agenda 21 (LA21) 
meets these objectives and, therefore, is one of the main instruments of management 
and intervention conducive to sustainable development («European Sustainable Cit-
ies Platform - AALBORG +10», 2004).
Nevertheless, several studies have questioned the authenticity of political com-
mitment towards meeting the objectives of sustainable development by local govern-
ments that have adhered to the LA21. This concern prompted the first research ques-
tion addressed in this paper: Do the municipalities that adhere to the LA21 devote 
a larger share of their budgets to waste management expenditures? Thus, the idea is 
to link waste management expenditure with the political commitment of local gov-
ernments so as to achieve the goals set by the LA21. The second research question 
attempts to gain deeper knowledge about the influence of the political character of 
local governments, the number of inhabitants, and the volume of the overall budget 
in waste management expenditure.
The main objective of this work is to measure the differences, in terms of the evo-
lution of waste management spending, between Spanish municipalities that adhered 
to the LA21 and those that did not.
In order to carry out this main purpose, four specific objectives were defined. 
The first target is to compare the behavior of municipalities in the control group (non 
LA21 municipalities) with that of the experimental group (LA21 municipalities). 
The next three specific objectives are oriented towards getting a better understanding 
about the influence of three factors in waste expenses —the political orientation of 
local governments, the population size, and the overall volume of budgetary funds.
This paper offers some differential innovations that exemplify its originality in 
relation to previous publications in this field. All of them are related to methodologi-
cal aspects. While other studies are based on the economic classification of budget, 
in this investigation the dependent variable is the waste management expenditure, 
understood from the perspective of the functional classification of municipal budgets. 
Furthermore, the methodology implemented for measuring the impact of public poli-
cies is Difference in Differences (DiD), instead of ordinary least square models. And, 
finally, municipal entities are utilised as the unit of analysis, in contrast with the use 
of provinces or regions in other works.
We did not find answers to these questions in the existing empirical literature on 
the assessment of LA21 experiences. Thus, in our opinion, this work, which is fo-
cused on local expenses for waste management, offers a novel approach in its evalua-
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tion of LA21 in terms of political commitment to environmental objectives. From the 
economic policy perspective, this assessment contributes to verifying how the disclo-
sure of preferences, in favour of environmental actions at the local level, is reflected 
in specific expenditure programs, and how some quality of life objectives play a part 
in the allocation of budgetary resources.
This work cannot be considered an overall assessment of the implementation of 
the LA21 or the effectiveness of these policies in Spain. Neither do we try to explain 
the determinants of waste management expenditure in local budgets. Our paper ad-
dresses a concrete research question: Did LA21 municipalities increase their budget-
ary resources for waste management policies more than those municipalities that did 
not adhere to it?
The following section offers a literature review focused on the development of 
the LA21 in Europe and in Spain in particular, as well as on the specific conditions 
of the provision of solid waste services in Spanish municipalities. At the end of this 
section, the hypotheses to be tested will be specified. The methodology section des-
ignates the temporal and geographical scopes of the work, the data sources, and the 
treatment of these data for the selection of the final sample. Then, in the results sec-
tion we will present our findings obtained from the econometric models (DiD). We 
close the work with a conclusions section, in which the results which refer to the 
hypotheses posed in the methodology section are discussed. Work constraints and 
major implications for local politics are also included in that portion.
2. Literature review
The objective of this section is to support the choice of variables and the con-
struction of hypotheses. Since our work presents the issue of waste management 
expenditure in the framework of LA21, this segment will put forward two different 
perspectives. The first one will be focused on those aspects related to the implemen-
tation of LA21 sustainability objectives. The second part will address the specific 
subject of solid waste management in Spain and its different models of management.
Most works studying the development of LA21 in different geographical envi-
ronments focus on analysing the implementation strategies of the Agenda at the local 
level. Sustainability as defined by the Brundtland Commission is an ambitious policy 
target. Environmental, economic, social, and institutional criteria are all considered 
to be of equal importance. Because of this complexity, the first step of the LA21 
process should be to develop a vision of a sustainable society based on indicators to 
measure its progress (Valentin and Spangenberg, 2000).
For instance, Adolfsson (2002) studied four small- to medium-sized municipali-
ties in Sweden and concluded that LA21 is a significant reinforcement for the devel-
opment of appropriate natural resource management at the local level. We encoun-
tered other works in a similar vein [(Foh Lee, 2001), (Rutherfoord, Blackburn and 
Spence, 2000), (Eckerberg and Forsberg, 1998)]. 
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Another widely explored perspective for the LA21 analysis that focused on the 
measurement of sustainable development outcomes pointed out that there is little 
evidence to indicate the effectiveness of these policies [(Poveda and Lipsett, 2011), 
(Thomas, 2010)]. Along this line of research, a realistic counterpoint emphasising 
problems of LA21 assessment was offered by Lafferty and Eckerberg (2013).
With regard to specific and integrated strategies for sustainability assessment, we 
also found several recent papers [(Devuyst, 1999), (Haapio and Viitaniemi, 2008), 
(Lawrence, 1997), (Nijkamp and Pepping, 1998), (Papadopoulos and Giama, 2009), 
(Cole and Valdebenito, 2013), (González, Martín, and Fernández, 2004)].
The study «Review of implementation of Agenda 21 and the Rio Principles» 
(2012) offers a detailed review of progress in implementation of LA21 from an in-
ternational perspective. It shows that progress has been uneven and, despite some 
elements of good practice, most LA21 outcomes have not yet been achieved. Never-
theless, regarding our main interest in this work, LA21 has been one of the most ex-
tensively followed up programmes from the United Nations Conference on Environ-
ment and Development (UNCED) and is widely cited as an unprecedented success in 
linking global goals to local action. Still, the progress so far does not mean that the 
work is over. In this regard, multi-level governance is a general recommendation, as 
well as increased integration between local authorities and multi-stakeholders in their 
communities (Stakeholder Forum for a Sustainable Future, 2012).
Regarding the implementation of LA21 in Spain, several recent studies provide 
a nearly complete picture of the situation [(Font and Subirats, 2000), (Hernández, 
2003), (Echebarria, Barrutia and Aguado, 2004), (Moralejo, Legarreta and Miguel, 
2007),(Hidalgo, 2008), (Martínez and Rosende, 2011), (Observatorio de la Sostenibi-
lidad, 2014), (Jiménez, 2008)].
In Spain, the Sustainable Development Strategy was introduced by the Govern-
ment in June 2000. It included the commitment to promote a new model of integra-
tion and the balancing of economic, social development and environmental protec-
tion in the long term. 
Most cities that have started the implementation of LA21 contain between 5,000 
and 50,000 inhabitants. Yet the participation of counties and town associations makes 
the adhesion to LA21 possible for many little towns as well. In addition, it should be 
highlighted that a great number of municipalities that adhered to LA21 are big cities 
like Barcelona, Madrid, Málaga, Sevilla, etc. In all cases, one of the most frequently 
used objectives in LA21 action plans has been oriented to urban solid waste manage-
ment.
The demands of rural and urban municipalities are clearly different. The former 
show major lacks in areas such as public transport, urban facilities and services ac-
cessibility, plus labour market. Alternatively, the latter have a greater need for en-
vironmental traffic control, waste management, or housing access (Hidalgo, 2008).
Regarding the environmental expenditure, we would like to point out the rel-
evance of the work by Aguado and Echebarria (2004) in which they analysed the situ-
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ation of the Spanish regions concerning budgetary expenditure intended for various 
environmental items. Their hypothesis tries to demonstrate the great influence that 
environmental spending has in implementing LA21. Concretely, they analysed 11 
groups of environmental expenditures. One of these groups is related to waste man-
agement expenses. That study mentions Cantabria and La Rioja as the two Spanish 
regions with more per capita expenditures for waste management. In addition, their 
work raises some doubts about the coherence between the political commitment to 
the Charter of Aalborg and the actual economic support for the implementation of 
local strategies oriented to sustainable development.
In this paper, our interest is focussed on the idea that the municipalities imple-
menting LA21 have more intense environmental awareness and greater expenses for 
solid waste management (Kveton, Louda, Slavik and Pelucha, 2014). Within this area 
of research, Lima, et al. (2012) analysed the determining factors in the development 
of environmental management practices, such as solid waste management. The ex-
planatory factors utilised were the size of the municipality, the adoption of proactive 
environmental strategies, and the implementation of LA21. The authors maintain that 
there is a positive relationship between the size of the municipality and the degree to 
which the local administration develops environmental management practices. Ac-
cordingly, Fidélis and Pires (2009) also concluded that the size of the municipality 
is an element that explains the degree of development of environmental management 
practices.
As a further factor, the Spanish Constitution establishes that minimum manda-
tory services must be provided by local administrations, although this does not imply 
that they have to be carried out internally. For this reason, privatisation is increasingly 
used in the management of local public services, including solid waste management 
(Vickers and Yarrow, 1991). Depending on greater or less private partners’ participa-
tion, privatisation can adopt different forms— mixed public and private production, 
which has been widely used in the United States (Warner and Hefetz, 2008); inter-
municipal cooperation, to achieve scale economies [(Bel and Costas, 2006), (Warner 
and Hefetz, 2003)]; and outsourcing, which is most commonly used in Spain and, in 
general, in Europe.
As a rule, the choice of one privatisation model or another is not ideological, but 
pragmatic. Before making a decision, local governments must manage factors like 
cost reduction, political interest, fiscal constraints, market competition and interest 
groups [(Bel and Miralles, 2003), (Bel and Fageda, 2007), (Bel and Fageda, 2008), 
(Bel and Fageda, 2009)]. The relative importance of these elements can vary sig-
nificantly, depending on whether the municipality is small or large. In any case, the 
importance assigned to the influencing factors is very sensitive to the characteristics 
of the particular study (Bel and Fageda, 2009).
Bel (2006) performed a multivariate analysis to determine if the form of pro-
duction of solid waste management service (public or outsourced) has any influ-
ence on municipal expenditures. Other research has shown ambiguous evidence in 
this regard, with respect to the existence of economies of scale, density or scope 
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[(Hirsch, 1965), (Kitchen, 1976), (Stevens, 1978), (Dubin and Navarro, 1988), 
(Callan and Thomas, 2001)]. Only a few studies have found significant scale econ-
omies in municipalities with less population [(Dubin and Navarro, 1988), (Bel, 
2006)]. Although it is argued that the manner of production (public or private) 
does not influence the costs borne by the municipalities [(Callan and Thomas, 
2001), (Bel, 2006), (Bel and Costas, 2006), (Ruiz-Villaverde, González-Gómez 
and J. Picazo- Tadeo, 2015)], some investigations indicate ambiguity. All studies, 
except that of Stevens (1978) which includes production cost information, use the 
concept of cost of service to refer to the municipal budget for the service payment. 
Therefore, we consider it more expedient to use the full coverage concept of mu-
nicipal expenditure.
One of the main objectives sought with privatisation of the service is the cost sav-
ings. Two main reasons justify this relationship. Firstly, privatisation introduces com-
petition where before there was a public monopoly. Costs reduction will be greater 
in those large cities where there is greater availability of external providers. Hence, 
large cities tend to privatise services more, while small ones often opt for outsourcing 
to public agencies. A second reason lies in the possibility of exploiting scale econo-
mies, especially important in small cities (Bel and Fageda, 2008). But the literature 
does not offer a clear relation between privatisation and cost savings [(Bel and War-
ner, 2008), (Bel and Mur, 2009). While initial research shows a saving in costs, this 
is not the case in more recent studies. One explanation would be that privatisation 
does not entail cost savings if there is no competition, a case that usually occurs when 
a public monopoly is replaced by a private one [(Bel and Warner, 2008), (Warner, 
2010)]. This circumstance focuses the debate on the transaction costs and regulations 
(Bel, Fageda and Warner, 2010).
Neither the public nor private production of the service has proved to be a perfect 
option. Hence many municipalities prefer mixed forms that provide greater flexibil-
ity. In rural areas and small municipalities, inter-municipal cooperation has been used 
as an alternative to privatisation in order to achieve scale economies [(Bel and Costas, 
2006), (Warner and Hefetz, 2003), (Warner and Hefetz, 2008), (Bel, Fageda and Mur, 
2013)]. Bel and Fageda (2006) analysed how inter-municipal cooperation between 
small municipalities can be an alternative, so as to offer local services efficiently.
Other local governments use partial privatisation, through a public-private joint 
venture, when cost, financial constraints, and private interests exert contradictory 
pressures. In Spain, private partners are often large companies with a market repu-
tation. They develop the functions associated with the service, but the government 
maintains the control of activities thus reducing transaction costs [(Bel and Costas, 
2006), (Warner and Bel, 2008), (Bel and Fageda, 2010)]. Public-private joint ven-
tures are also positively associated with inter-municipal cooperation. Bel and Fageda 
(2010) conclude that there is an inverse U-shaped relationship between the size of 
the municipality and the decision to partially privatise a service. According to the 
authors, ideological and political factors have no influence on the decision to use a 
joint venture.
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Another form of privatisation is the use of outsourcing, which allows the lo-
cal administration to maintain ownership and responsibility in the public service, 
although production is performed by an external agent (public or private). This pri-
vatisation implies a lower budget contribution to the financing of the service by the 
municipality, which usually entails an increase in the fees paid by users (Bel, 2002). 
Bel and Miralles (2003) and Bel, Fageda and Mur (2010) found a significant 
relationship between the demand for solid waste management, or the population of 
the municipality, and the decision to outsource the service. However, a clear relation 
between privatisation and size of the municipality has not been observed. Neither was 
statistical evidence found to support the relationship between local budget restric-
tions and the outsourcing decision, perhaps because this type of outsourcing does 
not generate direct revenues for the administration [(Bel and Miralles, 2003), (Bel, 
Fageda and Mur, 2010).
In summary, efficiency and pragmatic motives have a greater influence on out-
sourcing decisions than ideological goals. In this context, Bel, Fageda and Mur 
(2010) did not find a significant relationship between the political party that governs 
the corporation and outsourcing decisions.
In any case, political factors and ideological attitudes have been considered in 
various studies [(Dubin and Navarro, 1988), (Bel and Miralles, 2003), (Bel and Fage-
da, 2007), (Bel and Fageda, 2008)], because not only can they influence privatisation, 
but also economic, social and sustainable development as well. It has been argued 
that parties with left-wing ideologies are more aware of sustainable development 
and social participation (Prado and García, 2009). Moreover, Bel and Fageda (2008) 
concluded that the municipalities that opted for privatisation were governed by con-
servative parties. 
Albeit our approach ignores the issue of efficiency in spending, in Spain most 
of the projects considered to be examples of good practice (Federación Española de 
Municipios y Provincias-FEMP & Observatorio de la Sostenibilidad en España-OSE, 
2013) are linked to relevant initial investments. This connection makes it reasonable 
to associate political commitment with environmental expenditure, and more specifi-
cally, with the variable «waste management expenditure».
Several findings from the literature served as inspiration for the hypotheses that 
we will test in this work and the choice of the variables:
—  H1: The municipalities that adhered to LA21 experienced a greater increase 
of budgetary resources for expenditure functions related to waste manage-
ment in absolute terms.
—  H2: The municipalities that adhered to LA21 experienced a greater increase 
of budgetary resources for expenditure functions related to waste manage-
ment in per capita terms.
—  H3: The municipalities that adhered to LA21 experienced a greater increase 
of budgetary resources for expenditure functions related to waste manage-
ment with respect to their total budget.
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—  H4: The municipalities that adhered to LA21, with political tendencies 
towards the left, experienced a greater increase in the percentage of their 
budget devoted to expenditure functions related to waste management.
—  H5: The impact of LA21 on the amount of budgetary resources that munici-
palities devote to waste management varies depending on their size.
3. Methodology
The geographic scope of this study, before the application of the exclusion crite-
ria, covers 100% of the Spanish national territory. Regarding the temporal scope, the 
period covered is 2002-2012.
The quantitative analysis of this article is based on a database built from differ-
ent sources, in which we have combined the data from the final budgets for 2002 and 
2012, the population of each municipality for the years studied, the results of the 
municipal elections (1999-2011) and the ideology (L/R) of the political party that 
won the most votes in the municipal elections.
Regarding the budget, data have been obtained from the website of the Ministry 
of Finance and Public Administration (http://serviciostelematicosext.minhap.gob.es/
SGCAL/entidadeslocales/). It is important to note that in 2008 there was a legislative 
change in the accounting rules of local governments that came into force in 2010. 
This change generates a difference of content in functional programs related to envi-
ronmental expenditure between 2002 and 2012. 
In accordance with the Order of September 20, 1989, by which the structure of 
the local budgets is regulated, we have identified one spending sub-function for the 
year 2002, which is «4.4 Community Welfare».
For this work, the variable waste management expenditure in 2002 corresponds 
with the costs incurred by the municipalities in the program «4.4.2 Waste collection 
and street cleaning».
After 2010, a new sub-function was included in the functional classification of 
local budgets, the 17th policy «Environment» (Order EHA / 3565/2008, December 
3rd). But, specifically for waste management, the 16th policy «Community welfare» 
includes two programs: 162 «Collection, disposal and treatment of waste» and 163 
«Street cleaning».
Therefore, the waste management expenditure is taken from the functional clas-
sification of municipal budgets, by reference to the program 442 for 2002 and the 
sum of the programs 162 and 163 for 2012.
Data related to electoral consultations in recent legislatures were obtained from 
Consultation Election Results of the Ministry of Interior for 1999, 2003, 2007 and 
2011 (http://www.infoelectoral.interior.es/min/areaDescarga.html?method=inicio).
In total, a database was designed with 11,857 records corresponding to those of 
local authorities that are in the budget database of the years 2002 and 2012. From this 
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whole, a sample of 6,502 municipalities was selected. To choose this sample, we ap-
plied two exclusion criteria that prevent those municipalities lacking a budget in 2002 
or in 2012 and local government entities without associated population (Councils, 
Commonwealths, Counties, etc.) from being considered.
The experimental group was initially composed of 161 Spanish municipalities 
that in 2002 had adhered to the LA21 1. Finally, after we applied the exclusion crite-
ria, 6,502 municipalities were included in our study sample, of which 149 belonged 
to the experimental group (LA21) and the remaining 6,353 to the control group. 
Within each group, we distinguished two divisions of municipalities by popula-
tion size —the group of small sized municipalities and the group of medium and 
large sized municipalities. That separation was accomplished by taking the median 
population of the whole sample as the limit for each group.
Table 1 provides information on the coverage of the sample with respect to the 
number of municipalities and population, as well as to waste management expendi-
ture (in absolute terms, per capita, and in percentage over the whole budget).
















Year 2002 6,502 39,484,149 345,619.69 25.83 2.91
 Control Group 6,353 24,030,807 171,068.95 25.03 2.83
  Small Mun. 3,251 864,501 5,554.42 20.87 1.98
  Large Mun. 3,102 23,166,306 344,533.73 29.40 3.72
Experimental Group 149 15,453,342 7,788,041.52 59.95 6.51
  Large Mun. 149 15,453,342 7,788,041.52 59.95 6.51
Year 2012 6,502 44,634,760 650,948.04 23.23 2.33
 Control Group 6,353 27,786,938 346,029.23 21.39 2.16
  Small Mun. 3,251 876,791 2,331.02 5.88 0.42
  Large Mun. 3,102 26,910,147 706,236.48 37.65 3.99
Experimental Group 149 16,847,822 13,651,949.41 101.66 9.54
  Large Mun. 149 16,847,822 13,651,949.41 101.66 9.54
Source: Own elaboration with data extracted from Ministry of Finance and Public Administration (http://servicios-
telematicosext.minhap.gob.es/SGCAL/entidadeslocales/).
1 Data obtained from the study of Hernández Aja, A. (2003). According to this study, 409 munici-
palities had signed the Aalborg Charter by 2002. 189 municipalities confirmed their commitment to the 
Aalborg Charter in a survey. 149 of them appear in our database with environmental costs in their budgets.
Waste Management in the Spanish Municipalities: Is commitment to Local Agenda 21 more... 45
Investigaciones Regionales – Journal of Regional Research, 40 (2018) – Páginas 35 a 56
Between 2002 and 2012, waste management expenses experienced a significant 
increase, but this rise was concentrated in medium and large sized municipalities. 
The different strategies for waste management, which were noted in the literature 
(mixed public and private production, inter-municipal cooperation, and outsourcing), 
caused the decrease of the average waste management expenses in small towns in 
2012. In addition, there are no small municipalities within the experimental group 
and all the biggest cities are included. 
The coverage of the municipalities included in the sample exceeds 99% and 94% 
in terms of population in 2002 and 2012 respectively. The population contained in 
the experimental group represents 39% and 35% of the national population in 2002 
and 2012 respectively.
In both years, municipalities included in the experimental group —which ad-
hered to the LA21— show higher figures regarding waste management expenses per 
inhabitant and in relation to their whole budget.
In order to achieve the specific objectives and to test the hypotheses formulated, 
seven variables were utilised: 
— Waste management expenditure (final budget) in Euros.
— Waste management expenditure (final budget) in EUR/Inhabitant.
— Waste management expenditure (final budget) in %/Total budget.
— Total budget expenditure (final budget).
— Population (number of inhabitants).
— Local governments policy trend.
— Population size of towns (related to the median and to the average value).
The first three are dependent variables that define three different models (M1, 
M2, and M3). The next three are the independent or explicative variables. And the 
last one is the variable used to segment the database and solve the previous models 
in a separate manner. 
Given the great number of political parties, 1,391, that participated in the last 
four municipal elections, there was great difficulty in knowing the political affiliation 
of each municipal government. To simplify the analysis, we chose the ten political 
parties that obtained the most votes in a greater number of municipalities. These ten 
parties, because of coalitions between political parties produced during the period 
2003-2011, have been reduced to seven (CiU, EAJ-PNV/EA, ESQUERRA-AM, IU, 
PAR, PP, PSOE).
The experimental group shows a great concentration of large municipalities. For 
this reason, population size of towns has been included in econometric models, so as 
to have a segmentation of results depending on the size of municipalities. Regarding 
the population size, all municipalities were classified according to their size in rela-
tion to the median and the average size of the sample in 2002.
For the treatment of data and application of statistical techniques, software pack-
ages, SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences), SAS (Statistical Analysis Soft-
ware) and Eviews 8 were used.
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The econometric technique utilised to solve all models was Difference in Differ-
ences. The DiD method estimates the counterfactual change in the result for the treat-
ment group by calculating the change in the result for the comparison group, which 
takes into account any constant difference over time between the two groups (Gertler, 
et al., 2011). What is being applied in DiD models is the double differences. The first 
difference is calculated for the results of the experimental group before and after, 
that is, considering the constant factors over time for this group. But, to thoroughly 
observe the variable factors throughout the duration of time, we should also measure 
the change before and after the results in the control group that was exposed to the 
same conditions. This is the second difference. 
Thus, the DiD method would combine the two false counterfactuals (before and 
after comparisons, and comparisons between experimental and control groups) in 
order to generate a better estimate of the counterfactual. This method does not require 
rules for the allocation of individuals in the treatment group, but requires that the 
control group could represent a change in the results that the treatment group would 
have experienced in the absence of the program. 
The Difference in Differences method (DiD) has been used widely when the 
evaluation of a given intervention entails the collection of panel data or repeated 
cross sections. DiD integrates the advances of the fixed effects estimators with the 
causal inference analysis, when unobserved events or characteristics confound the 
interpretations (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
Despite the existence of other plausible methods based on the availability of ob-
servational data for quasi-experimental causal inference —i.e., matching methods, 
instrumental variable, regression discontinuity— DiD estimations offer a beneficial 
alternative, reaching the unconfoundedness by controlling for unobserved character-
istics and combining them with observed or complementary information. Addition-
ally, the DiD is a flexible form of causal inference, because it can be combined with 
some other procedures, such as the Kernel Propensity Score and the quintile regres-
sion (Villa, 2012).
For the econometric assessment of the impact of the LA21 on waste management 
spending, the next base regression is used (Pérez and Moral, 2015):
 y = a0 + a1g + a2t + a3g × t + b1X1 + b2X2 + e [1]
where,
y is the waste management expenditure.
g is the dummy variable that distinguishes the group (treatment or control).
t is the dummy variable defining the baseline and the endline.
g × t is the interaction between the dummy variables G and T.
X1 is a control variable corresponding to Total Budget.
X2 is a control variable corresponding to Population.
e represents the error term.
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The g × t estimated coefficient, a3, is the statistical representation of differ-
ence in differences, which assesses the impact of LA21 on waste management 
spending.
The dependent variable (y ) will take three different forms— the waste manage-
ment expenditure in absolute terms (Euros) (M1), in per capita terms (EUR/inhabit-
ant) (M2), and in percentage of the whole budget (M3).
In addition to the previous main model, two fixed effects panel data models were 
built. One was according to Autonomous Communities and the other by political 
character of local governments. As a consequence, in addition to estimating and eval-
uating the impact of LA21 on waste management expenditure, comparisons could 
also be made between regions and between options within the political spectrum.
To reinforce the consistency of the results obtained through the DiD models, 
these models have been subjected to some stress tests. Firstly, the control variables 
included in the models are stressed. For that, the M1 model will be solved in three 
alternative formats— not including control variables, including only the per capita 
budget, and including budget and per capita income. Secondly, the control group is 
stressed. So as to find the counterfactual closest to the experimental group, only those 
municipalities with more than 10,000 inhabitants are included in the model. With this 
population limit, the experimental group and the control group are reduced to 137 
and 502 municipalities, respectively.
4. Results
The results of the estimates were verified by statistical software packages men-
tioned in the methodology section. All estimates have undergone the appropriate tests 
to verify that the required assumptions (normality of residuals, heteroskedasticity, 
multicollinearity, no correlation of disturbances) were met, as well as the various 
criteria that inform about the predictive capacity of the models (Table 2).
Table 2 shows the results of three different models (M1, M2, M3) as regards three 
groups of municipalities (Y1, Y2, Y3). The first group refers to all municipalities in-
cluded in the sample; the second one only contains those municipalities with a popu-
lation size less than the average; and the third one simply includes municipalities 
with a population size equal to or larger than the average. Initially, we tried to make 
the segmentation of the sample according to the median population size of munici-
palities. But results were not coherent with the fundamentals of DiD models, because 
all municipalities smaller than the median were in the control group and none in the 
experimental group. Thus, models Y2 and Y3 could be considered a sensitivity analy-
sis with respect to the model Y1.
Taking into account the whole sample, results are very clear and ratify our hy-
potheses H1, H2, and H3. The coefficients of the variable GxT, representing the in-
teraction between the two dummy variables of the model (G and T), are positive and 
statistically significant. Thus, it is confirmed that municipalities adhering to LA21 
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Table 2. Difference in Differences Models 
Y1: Waste Management Expenditure














Intercept –180587.889 –9.346 0.000 24.670 45.765 0.000 2.751 57.501 0.000
g: LA21 (1) vs non-
LA21(0)
–2665335.911 –20.114 0.000 25.637 6.935 0.000 1.939 5.911 0.000
t: After (1) vs before (0) 61555.686 2.261 0.024 –3.679 –4.845 0.000 –0.662 –9.829 0.000
g × t: Interaction term 2231729.376 12.275 0.000 45.193 8.910 0.000 4.412 9.802 0.000
Total Budget 0.092 87.753 0.000 0.000 –0.813 0.416 0.000 –12.052 0.000
Population 21.634 17.907 0.000 0.000 3.379 0.001 0.000 15.065 0.000
Model Summary DW: 2.002 0.000 DW: 1.900 0.000 DW: 1.900 0.000
Adjusted r-squared 0.945 0.054 0.079
Y2: Waste Management Expenditure in Small Municipalities














Intercept –21519.899 –16.987 0.000 16.574 31.382 0.000 1.646 37.122 0.000
g: LA21 (1) vs non-
LA21(0)
–41626.288 –1.303 0.193 –7.295 –0.548 0.584 –0.582 –0.520 0.603
t: After (1) vs before (0) –2843.022 –1.758 0.079 –12.553 –18.616 0.000 –1.350 –23.849 0.000
g × t: Interaction term 30773.295 0.681 0.496 15.269 0.811 0.417 1.992 1.260 0.208
Total Budget 0.050 46.567 0.000 0.000 31.799 0.000 0.000 7.668 0.000
Population 4.118 3.953 0.000 –0.006 –14.650 0.000 0.000 12.977 0.000
Model Summary DW: 2.019 0.000 DW: 1.953 0.000 DW: 1.920 0.000
Adjusted r-squared 0.483 0.146 0.159
Y3: Waste Management Expenditure in Medium-Sized or Large Municipalities














Intercept –930064.995 –6.487 0.000 44.667 24.672 0.000 5.500 35.267 0.000
g: LA21 (1) vs  
non-LA21(0)
–2191224.522 –5.893 0.000 16.820 3.582 0.000 0.552 1.365 0.172
t: After (1) vs before (0) 620207.246 3.117 0.002 33.267 13.238 0.000 2.928 13.528 0.000
g × t: Interaction term 1857777.929 3.590 0.000 5.928 0.907 0.364 0.401 0.712 0.476
Total Budget 0.090 32.189 0.000 0.000 3.647 0.000 0.000 –3.018 0.003
Population 25.442 7.916 0.000 0.000 -2.741 0.006 0.000 3.925 0.000
Model Summary DW: 2.012 0.000 DW: 2.005 0.000 DW: 2.009 0.000
Adjusted r-squared 0.945 0.139 0.122
Source: own elaboration.
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devote more budgetary resources to waste management in absolute terms, in per cap-
ita terms, and in terms of percentage of their whole budget.
After the segmentation of the sample regarding the average population size, 
all coefficients for the g × t variable were positive but not statistically signifi-
cant, except for Medium-Sized or Large Municipalities, when the measurements 
of budgetary resources devoted to waste management were taken in absolute terms. 
This model based on expenses in absolute terms (M1) ratified the hypothesis H5, 
because the variable g × t is statistically significant only for Medium-Sized or 
Large Municipalities. Thus, the adherence to the LA21 has a positive effect on the 
budgetary resources devoted to waste management in large municipalities but not 
in small ones.
The results of the stress tests on the M1 model confirmed the results obtained 
in the original models, that is, the positive sign and the statistical significance of 
the variable g × t. However, by including in the model only those municipalities 
with more than 10,000 inhabitants, the results are weakened; the g × t variable 
still has a positive sign and is statistically significant, but only at a level of 10%. 
These results confirm the high sensitivity of the model to the population size of 
the municipalities included in it, as can be seen from the segmented models Y2 
and Y3.
Based on the whole sample of municipalities, a fixed effects panel data model 
was adjusted, including the Spanish Autonomous Communities as factor (Table 3).
The fixed effects models ratify the sign of parameters estimated in the DiD model 
(Y1) and their statistical significance, and this makes it possible to know the different 
effect that LA21 has had in each region. 
Table 3 reflects the results obtained from the whole sample of municipalities. 
When we differentiate between small and medium/large sized municipalities, the re-
sults are similar to those presented in Table 3. Therefore, we only found positive 
effects of adhering to LA21 in the municipalities of medium or large size, when we 
took as a dependent variable the expenditure on waste management in absolute terms. 
In the other cases, we did not find positive and significant results. 
Regardless of the selection of municipalities, in all cases Models 2 and 3 ex-
hibit a more homogeneous picture regarding the influence of the different regions on 
waste management expenditures. In accordance with these models, municipalities 
from Melilla, Balearic Islands, Canary Islands, Murcia, Basque Country, and Cata-
lonia stand out with significant and high positive estimates. The municipalities of 
these Autonomous Communities that adhered to the LA21 are the ones that have the 
greatest influence on the results of the general model.
The second fixed effects panel data model includes as a factor the political 
character of local governments. The political character of the right-wing munici-
palities (value 1) was a positive and significant variable, as were those of the other 
two trends [left (0) and centre (2)], but with the highest estimate value in Models 1 
and 2. This fact indicates that this is the variable that exerts the greatest influence 
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on the overall increase in budgetary allocations for waste management. Nonethe-
less, model 3 indicates that municipalities with leftist political tendencies have a 
greater effect on waste management expenses in terms of percentage of the whole 
budget (Table 4).
Table 3. Fixed Effects Model 2002-2012 CCAA
Y1: Waste Management Expenditure










t: After (1) vs before (0) 61443.101 2.266 0.023 –3.674 –5.292 0.000 –0.664 –10.815 0.000
g: LA21 (1) vs  
non-LA21(0)
–2701592.634 –20.292 0.000 8.568 2.513 0.012 0.641 2.129 0.033
g × t: Interaction term 2231660.402 12.321 0.000 45.086 9.720 0.000 4.302 10.496 0.000
Total Budget 0.092 86.869 0.000 0.000 –0.531 0.595 0.000 –11.030 0.000
Population 21.978 17.987 0.000 0.000 2.813 0.005 0.000 13.699 0.000
Andalucía –384252.115 –8.414 0.000 27.988 23.930 0.000 3.452 33.402 0.000
Aragón –181839.613 –3.758 0.000 14.932 12.050 0.000 1.407 12.851 0.000
Canarias –547049.972 –4.654 0.000 59.788 19.860 0.000 5.992 22.524 0.000
Cantabria –93314.219 –0.844 0.399 29.885 10.556 0.000 3.834 15.324 0.000
Castilla y León –87441.882 –2.965 0.003 7.274 9.632 0.000 1.071 16.053 0.000
Castilla-La Mancha –140319.955 –3.221 0.001 15.664 14.040 0.000 2.072 21.015 0.000
Cataluña –101538.308 –2.558 0.011 48.402 47.621 0.000 4.567 50.851 0.000
Cdad. Foral de Navarra –271086.423 –3.610 0.000 11.455 5.957 0.000 1.322 7.778 0.000
Comunidad de Madrid –378338.517 –3.978 0.000 42.606 17.493 0.000 4.184 19.442 0.000
Comunitat Valenciana –152176.586 –2.829 0.005 35.404 25.699 0.000 4.087 33.574 0.000
Extremadura –173170.454 –2.768 0.006 24.816 15.487 0.000 3.287 23.214 0.000
Galicia –300516.385 –4.422 0.000 24.356 13.994 0.000 4.021 26.145 0.000
Illes Balears 231695.516 1.661 0.097 106.003 29.672 0.000 9.709 30.756 0.000
La Rioja –138617.148 –1.459 0.145 25.218 10.365 0.000 2.402 11.172 0.000
Melilla –6607789.492 –6.082 0.000 164.947 5.929 0.000 9.252 3.763 0.000
País Vasco –311350.677 –4.391 0.000 53.151 29.269 0.000 4.237 26.405 0.000
Principado de Asturias –656846.588 –5.052 0.000 33.186 9.967 0.000 4.227 14.368 0.000
Región de Murcia –325919.510 –1.942 0.052 57.268 13.324 0.000 6.649 17.507 0.000
Source: own elaboration.
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Table 4. Fixed Effects Model 2002-12 Political parties
Y1: Waste Management Expenditure










t: After (1) vs before (0) 61564.022 2.262 0.024 –3.679 –4.844 0.000 –0.662 –9.831 0.000
g: LA21 (1) vs  
non-LA21(0)
–2660427.027 –20.078 0.000 25.669 6.942 0.000 1.924 5.863 0.000
g × t: Interaction term 2232041.314 12.280 0.000 45.196 8.910 0.000 4.412 9.803 0.000
Total Budget 0.092 87.762 0.000 0.000 –0.817 0.414 0.000 –12.046 0.000
Population 21.638 17.914 0.000 0.000 3.380 0.001 0.000 15.064 0.000
Political Sign (0 - Left) –216366.661 –7.856 0.000 24.497 31.874 0.000 2.883 42.275 0.000
Political Sign (1 - Right) –144936.084 –6.207 0.000 25.053 38.450 0.000 2.681 46.381 0.000
Political Sign (2 - Others) –221353.970 –6.215 0.000 23.836 23.985 0.000 2.713 30.766 0.000
Source: own elaboration.
Models 1 and 2 indicate that the effect of LA21 in waste management expenditures 
is greater in those municipalities governed by right-wing parties. Thus, the fourth hy-
pothesis cannot be confirmed, although the descriptive results indicate a greater increase 
of environmental expenses in municipalities that adhered to LA21 and were governed 
by leftist parties. As regards this conclusion, the composition of the sample plays a de-
terminant role. 49 out of 52 Spanish capital provinces are included within the sample. 
And 35 out of 49 capital provinces included in the sample are governed by a right-wing 
political party. These largest cities concentrate 65.77% of population of the experimen-
tal group and 25.74% of the whole population included in the sample. So, the political 
trend resulting from the model is clearly determined by these 35 elements of the sample.
5. Conclusions
The research question that motivates this work arises from specialised literature 
on environmental issues and relates to the genuineness of the political commitment 
to the environmental objectives of those local governments that adhered to the LA21. 
The functional scope was limited to waste management, and political commitment 
was measured through the variation in budgetary resources allocated for that func-
tion. Our main data source is the publication of the Spanish local budgets implemen-
tation (execution) by the Ministry of Finance and Public Administration for the years 
2002 and 2012. The geographic scope of the work covers the entire national territory 
and the unit of analysis is the municipalities.
Regarding the econometric methodology, the difference in differences models 
that we utilised included as control variables the population of the municipalities and 
52 Navarro-Espigares, J. L., Martín-Segura, J. A., Pérez-López, C., Maraver-Tarifa, G.
Investigaciones Regionales – Journal of Regional Research, 40 (2018) – Páginas 35 a 56
their total budgets. In this way, the models, by comparing two groups of municipali-
ties, were able to verify whether municipalities that adhered to the LA21 increased 
their budgetary expenditure on waste management more than those that did not.
The population size of municipalities included in the models is determinant 
for the confirmation of the hypotheses formulated. With the whole sample of 6,502 
municipalities, most of the original hypotheses have been corroborated. The results 
show that the municipalities that adhered to LA21 devoted more budgetary resources 
to expenditure functions related to waste management. But the verification of the first 
three hypotheses is weak, because it is sensitive to the size of municipalities included 
in the sample and to the variable used to measure the waste management expenditure. 
In general, the population, the total budgetary expenditure and the political char-
acter of the municipalities exerted a significant influence on the evolution of waste 
management expenditure. In those municipalities that adhered to LA21 and were 
governed by left-wing parties, the percentage of their budget devoted to waste man-
agement is the highest.
Some methodological limitations of this study should be noted, although in our 
opinion, in no case did these limitations cast doubt on the validity of the results. The 
first one relates to the modification of accounting methodology for local entities. This 
change caused a break in the time series of environmental spending. However, since 
this circumstance affected all municipalities, we consider that this does not invalidate 
or limit the reliability of the DiD analysis carried out.
The second one involves the political character of local governments. Since no 
official statistics are available regarding the political parties of the mayors who gov-
erned the Spanish municipalities in the years 2002-2012, to calculate the political 
tendency of municipal governments, we used the statistics resulting from the elec-
tions of 1999-2003-2007 and 2011. The party that won the highest number of votes 
has been regarded as representing the political character of each electoral period.
Finally, the third limitation concerns the different levels of territorial govern-
ments that participate in waste management expenditures. This research focuses on 
the waste management expenses covered by decentralised budgets of local govern-
ments. Obviously upper tiers of governments at county, regional or national levels 
play an important, sometimes decisive, role in the whole waste management expen-
diture. But only local governments are the subject of interest in this particular study. 
As an additional note,, we consider it appropriate to clarify that the aim of this 
paper is not to evaluate the success of local governments in implementing LA21. We 
simply try to verify the causal relationship between LA21 adherence and the evolu-
tion of waste management spending during the period 2002-2012. For that reason, 
other determinant variables for environmental spending have not been included in the 
econometric models. The control variables contained in the models aim to eliminate 
the bias exerted by the largest municipalities, specifically when waste management 
expenditure is measured in absolute terms (M1). Nevertheless, as we have shown, 
size of municipalities is a crucial issue. Specifically, small municipalities are usually 
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involved in new strategies of waste management that are different from the traditional 
public provision of the service. These new managerial forms make it difficult to mea-
sure the resources devoted to waste management service, thus limiting the scope of 
this work.
As for the policy implications, it should be highlighted that increasing budgetary 
allocations for environmental expenditure in a period of economic crisis and bud-
getary constraints implies a high commitment to the objectives of LA21 in terms 
of promoting a model of sustainable development. With respect to the international 
context, we found some similarities in Norway. For one thing, Norway also devotes 
increasing amounts of economic resources for waste management. In addition,, re-
garding the political commitment of those municipalities that adhered to LA21, the 
results of DiD models showed great sensitivity to the population size of municipali-
ties, although this time in favour of small municipalities (Navarro et al., 2016).
Finally, we wish to remark that the commitment to waste management of local 
governments adhering to the LA21 as well as their budgetary backing should be 
carefully handled. This is because methodological issues can lead to different con-
clusions. In concrete terms, the role of small and medium-sized municipalities and 
the influence of political character of local governments may vary, depending on the 
choice researchers make regarding how the measurement of waste management ex-
penses is to be carried out —in absolute terms, in per capita terms, or as a percentage 
of the whole budget. Still, we believe that this study makes a meaningful contribu-
tion concerning the issue of whether political commitment to Local Agenda 21 is 
supported with action towards achieving the objectives of sustainable development 
through budgetary support for waste management policies. 
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